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ABSTRACT
The study of the Iranian revolution as a model of Islamic 
revolution has failed to explain why a revolution has not 
occurred in other Muslim countries. Egypt, for example, is 
undergoing many of the same structural and spiritual crises 
that Pahlavi Iran experienced, as well as witnessing a rise in 
the power of Islamic revival movements. Although the radical 
Islamic revival groups in Egypt advocate an Islamic 
revolution, the political, cultural, and religious differences 
between Iran and Egypt have kept the current government of 
Egypt in place.
v
ISLAMIC REVIVAL MOVEMENTS AND REVOLUTION 
THE CASES OF IRAN AND EGYPT
The revolution in Iran has been studied as a paradigm of 
Islamic revolution by many political scientists seeking to 
understand Islamic revivalist movements in the rest of the 
Muslim world. By studying the Iranian revolution, scholars 
hope to predict the next revolution. Scholars take two basic 
theoretical approaches. Structuralists argue that the 
revolution occurred because the Pahlavi regime did not respond 
with appropriate political reforms to social and economic 
changes which rocked the foundation and structure of 
traditional Iranian life. The cultural or spiritual approach 
theorizes that the Islamic revolution found fertile ground in 
Iran because modernization became equated with Westernization, 
which in turn meant dependency on foreign aid, destruction of 
traditional culture, and a moral unraveling of society. This 
cultural breakdown proceeded without providing the benefits of 
Westernization as widely seen either on television or in the 
excesses of the wealthy minority. The second model thus 
focuses on spiritual reasons for a revival. Both approaches 
to the study of Islamic revival assume that it eventually 
engenders revolution.
But these theories of Islamic revival and revolution 
cannot be generalized primarily because they fail to take into
2
consideration the different types of Islamic revival 
movements, the historical differences between Iran and the 
rest of the Muslim world, and the different regime responses 
toward Islamic revival movements. This failure stems from the 
mistaken assumptions that Islamic revival movements present a 
homogeneous opposition to the regime, that the revivalist 
movements are transnational, and that states have not learned 
from the example of the Iranian revolution how to respond to 
an Islamic challenge.
Scholars, among them David Menashri, Johannes Jansen, and 
Werner Ende, have brought up the possibility of Islamic 
revolutions following the Iranian model in the rest of the 
Muslim world.1 This paper will show that attempts to make the 
Iranian revolution the model for all Islamic revolutions have 
failed to explain why a revolution has not occurred in Egypt, 
for example, which exhibits most of the structural and 
spiritual problems of Pahlavi Iran, and also like Pahlavi 
Iran, finds itself in the grip of an Islamic revival.
Current Literature on Islamic Revolution
I. Structuralist Models
Scholars like Bassam Tibi, Philip Khoury, and Ervand 
Abrahamian, among others, root Islamic protest and revolution 
in the disruptive effect of modernization on social and 
economic structures.2 The inability of the state to respond
4to the disruption is perceived by the people as a crisis of 
the state. The regime loses legitimacy, prompting attempts at 
overthrowing it to replace it with an Islamic government.
Bassam Tibi argues that a repoliticization of Islam takes 
place in countries where the socio-economic structures have 
been so disrupted, and the political systems so deligitimated, 
that "Islamists11 propose a return to the pure ideology of 
Islam. Their aim is to achieve order in society following the 
rules that established the first muslim city, Medina. 
Although these movements suffer from a lack of concrete 
solutions to the structural problems of society other than the 
return to Islam, Tibi believes that they are attractive 
because they offer meaning "in a situation lacking meaningful 
cause.1,3
Philip Khoury proposes a more comprehensive analysis of 
the causes of Islamic "revivalism" in the Arab world. He 
delves more deeply into the problem of the crisis of the state 
than does Tibi, finding that Islamic revivalists react to the 
state's inability to bring the society as a whole into 
modernity. Those most likely to react are those who have been 
left behind by the process of modernization: the classes which 
have not been assimilated, yet have suffered from being forced 
to change what they were/
The inability of the state to bring modernity to all its 
people may steifi from regime exhaustion in the face of regional 
or international pressures to accept its status as a weaker 
entity in a world order dictated by the West.5 The state's
crisis may also be due to elites coopted by the West, 
consolidating their power and opening, rather than closing, 
the gap in wealth between themselves and the lower classes. 
The lower classes then react by joining Islamic revivalist 
groups. Khoury also considers the effect of the economic and 
political crises of the 1970s, which undermined the legitimacy 
of many Arab regimes.
Finally, Khoury points out that Islam becomes the vehicle 
for economic and political demands, rather than the impulse. 
This is a movement for the correction of the structural 
breakdown of society in the guise of a puritanical ideology. 
He specifies,
In sum, rapid urbanization without dynamic 
industrialization, the increasing inability of the state 
to distribute goods and services adequately, the retreat 
from pan-Arabism, successive defeats at the hands of 
Israel, and mounting external pressures on the state to 
liberalize the economic system (liberalization, among 
other things, contributed directly to escalating 
inflation in the 1970s) combined to increase polarization 
in Arab society. One important expression of this 
polarization has been Islamic revivalism.6
In other words, the breakdown of traditional society brought 
on by incomplete and unequal modernization polarizes a 
population previously ideologically homogeneous or 
unconcerned.
The leaders and adherents of Islamic revivalist movements 
come from the urban classes most affected by the loss of 
traditional stability. They have suffered, rather than 
benefited from, the state’s attempt at modernizing society
6from above. The leaders are most likely to be members of the 
urban lower-middle class who live in the old city and maintain 
ties with the countryside. They are relatively well educated, 
having attended state schools, but have not found employment 
to match their level of education or to meet their financial 
needs. These people would have liked to move out of the old 
city and the old system and into the new city but have been 
limited by income, inflation, or lack of foreign language 
skills in an economy increasingly dependent on international 
contacts.7
According to Khoury and other scholars, the membership of 
Islamic revivalist movements tend to be recent immigrants to 
the city, usually living in inadequate housing in the 
peripheral districts of the city.8 These people, who make up 
the pool of casual labor, are unemployed or underemployed. 
They are cut off from their rural roots, from their socio­
cultural traditions, and feel disoriented in the urban 
culture. They also experience alienation, and attempt to 
reinforce and preserve their identities by clinging to 
traditional culture and values.9
Both the leadership and the rank and file of Islamic 
revivalist movements feel alienated by mobilization without 
assimilation. Their lack of opportunities in the modernized 
sectors of society and the economy, the relative insecurity 
and instability of their daily lives, contrast starkly with 
the flaunted wealth, decadence, and corruption of the modern 
elites.
7Ervand Abrahamian echoes the themes of lower-middle class 
alienation, poor government response, and polarization of 
society. Abrahamian emphasizes the role of the economic 
crisis of 1975-1977 in bringing down the Pahlavis in Iran.10 
A regime can survive an economic crisis if it claims the 
loyalty of a large segment of society. But in the case of 
Iran, society had turned against the Shah during his reign.
Between 1953 and 1977, Iran underwent tremendous 
industrial growth due to its oil revenues. Revenues were used 
in part to modernize Iran, through education, economic and 
social projects. The state's hold on Iranian society grew 
stronger as its bureaucracy expanded.
The modern classes— which Abrahamian separates into the 
salaried middle class and the urban proletariat— grew at 
astonishing rates. The salaried middle class doubled by 1977, 
while the urban working class went from making up 5 percent of 
the country's labor force in 1953 to 16 percent in 1977.11
But these classes were the first to join the mullahs in 
their protests against the regime. Abrahamian contends that 
these classes became progressively disenchanted with the 
Shah's regime beginning in 1953. In that year the coup which 
overthrew the popular Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq also 
obliterated the intermediate groups— labor unions, 
professional associations and independent political parties—  
which would have normally linked the lower and middle classes 
with the political sector. This distance between the lower 
and middle classes and the government stretched into a gulf,
8when it became obvious that the government’s -programs 
benefited the upper classes far more than the rest of Iranian 
society.
Damage to the structure of Iranian society came from the 
very same programs designed to modernize Iran. Here one 
learns of the failures pointed out by Philip Khoury. 
Education and health reform during the White Revolution of 
1963 increased the number of physicians and the rate of 
literacy in Iran, while also reducing infant mortality rates. 
However, after 14 years of White Revolution, Abrahamian 
writes,
68 percent of adults remained illiterate, the number of 
illiterates actually rose from 13 million to 15 million, 
less than 40 percent of children completed primary 
school, only 60,000 university places were available for 
as many as 290,000 applicants and the doctor-patient 
ratio remained of the worst in the whole of Western 
Asia.12
Urban development programs brought the same unequal 
modernization to city-dwellers as peripheral shanty-towns 
multiplied and pollution increased. Tehran did not have a 
modern sewage system or adequate public transportation to cut 
through the city's terrible traffic jams.
Meanwhile, the countryside suffered from the failure of 
agricultural reforms. Land ownership remained essentially in 
the hands of old aristocracy and absentee landlords, with 1 
million landholders owning fewer than 3 hectares each, while 
700 000 peasants remained landless.13
Thus urban and rural problems in Iran depicted by 
Abrahamian closely parallel the inequities reported by Khoury.
But Abrahamian goes one step further. The population, 
dissatisfied with the economic situation— and disgusted with 
the conspicuously wealthy minority— had no political arena in 
which to air its views. The Shah, while attempting to 
modernize the economy, had consolidated his political power by 
eradicating all organs of political participation other than 
the Rastakhiz party.14 By doing so, he lost his political 
base of support and severed ties with the traditional middle 
class, which had long supported the monarchy.
The traditional middle class, composed mainly of bazaar 
merchants— who controlled nearly two thirds of the country's 
retail trade— became alienated from the monarchy when it too 
lost its guilds and professional organizations in the wake of 
the formation of the Rastakhiz party. The bazaaris, merchants 
who were also money-lenders, wielded considerable influence 
over their employees, associates, brokers, and the countryside 
where they owned commercial farms and manufacturing plants.15
But more importantly, the bazaaris maintained social, 
financial, and ideological links with the religious 
establishment. This link proved to be the most dangerous 
association of all for the government to test by abolishing 
traditional guilds in favor of state-sponsored and supervised 
organizations. Not content with destroying the bazaaris' 
professional organizations, state officials also talked of 
bulldozing the bazaars entirely to make way for a state-run 
market.16
During the inflationary period between 1975 and 1977, the
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Shah blamed the economic crisis on the bazaars, while also 
waging a war of control against the religious establishment. 
He attempted to wrest spiritual leadership of the nation from 
the until-then quiescent religious hierarchy by announcing the 
advent of a great new civilization, encouraging Parliament to 
disregard the religious laws, and establishing a Religious 
Corps to nationalize religion.17
Protests by the religious establishment elicited a harsh 
regime crackdown, during which many prominent clerics were 
imprisoned. Benefiting from the population’s animosity toward 
the regime and its disenchantment with the economic situation, 
the mullahs also argued that modernization and urbanization 
had brought moral laxity to Iranian society. They advocated 
traditional values and religious laws as the antidote to 
crime, alcoholism, prostitution, delinquency, and other social 
ills. The tiny anti-regime religious opposition expanded to 
include the previously accommodating clerics who found that 
the regime would not hear their grievances.
The combination of the traditional middle classes, the 
disenchanted modern middle and lower classes, and the 
religious opposition proved too much for the regime to put 
down. Thus the Shah lost his monarchy because he did not 
provide political outlets for his people, who then turned to 
the religious establishment.
Jerrold Green provides, among the structuralists, the 
most comprehensive analysis of the Iranian revolution. 
According to Green, the breakdown of the monarchy stemmed from
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its weakening capacity to coerce its opposition, combined with 
the mobilization of previously non-political sectors of the 
population under the leadership of the religious elite.18
His model describes the six conditions leading to 
countermobilization:
1. The declining coercive will or capacity of the state.
2. A simplification of politics.
3. Mass polarization.
4. The politicization of traditionally non-political 
social sectors.
5. Crisis-initiating event(s).
6. Exacerbating responses by the regime.19
The state exhibited its declining coercive will in Iran, 
according to Green, through its inability to react 
consistently to pressures from within and without. 
Specifically, internal political activity in the form of 
manifestos and open letters from the secular opposition, and 
religious demonstrations and marches by the mobilized urban 
classes triggered a cycle of tolerance and violent repression 
from the Shah. Early in Iran's revolution, the Shah was under 
international pressure to liberalize his regime. The Carter 
administration in particular sent frequent messages to the 
Shah regarding the deplorable human rights situation in Iran. 
This is why, according to Green, the Shah did not respond 
violently at first to the nascent protest.
The short experiment with liberalization, called the 
"Tehran Spring" by some, was followed by numerous instances of 
military repression of processions and demonstrations in Qum, 
Tabriz, and Tehran.20 But, Green argues, the Shah was 
resppnding to the symptoms rather than to the malady itself,.
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by using intermittent force in a limited and inefficient 
manner. He alienated the majority of the population without 
striking at the leaders of the revolution.
When the regime struck at the revolutionary leaders, it 
did so in an inefficient and even inflammatory way. A Tehran 
daily newspaper, an organ of the government, published a 
letter attacking Ayatollah Khomeini, defaming his character, 
and blaming him for the deaths of demonstrators. This letter 
provoked spontaneous riots and demonstrations in Tehran and 
Qum, by people who could not countenance the personal attack 
on the respected and charismatic religious leader.21 Far 
from discrediting the Ayatollah Khomeini, the letter provided 
him with a ready-made base of support and vaulted him into the 
leadership of the unfocused opposition.
This attack on Khomeini characterizes the role of the 
government in polarizing the population and simplifying 
politics. The population saw two opposite poles, with few 
political choices in the middle. Given its experience with 
the government and the ever-clearer message from the religious 
opposition that the choice lay between the forces of light and 
those of darkness, the population chose the religious 
opposition. Secular opponents of the regime threw in their 
lot with the religious establishment, realizing that the 
strength of the popular support the clerics could marshall far 
outweighed their own base of support.22
Although the middle classes had been previously 
politicized through political participation and education, the
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majority of the Iranian population did not exhibit much 
political awareness before the revolution gained momentum. 
Under the direction of the mullahs, millions of newly 
urbanized peasants participated in peaceful demonstrations 
against the Shah's regime.23
Before full countermobilization can be reached, one more 
condition must be met. Green sees crisis-initiating events 
and exacerbating regime responses as essential in the 
transition from reformism to revolution. The Khomeini letter 
provoked demonstrations, which led to government repression, 
more gatherings, and martyrs for the cause. A fire at a 
movie-theater which killed 4 00 people was blamed on the reform 
movement by the government. In response, the religious 
opposition investigated the fire and found evidence of secret 
police involvement. On September 8, 1978 the military
violently put down riots in Tehran, prompting Khomeini to 
announce that Muslims would not kill Muslims and thus the 
government must have employed Israeli troops to shoot at the 
rioters.24 This was followed by martial law in many cities.
Many other incidents and regime responses served to 
intensify the climate of revolution. When violence could not 
stop the religious opposition, the Shah offered jobs in the 
bureaucracy, lowered taxes, and dismissed the minister of 
women's affairs. Yet just as the violence had incensed the 
followers of the religious opposition, the financial 
inducements disgusted them, additional proof that the regime 
had lost all legitimacy and had to resort to bribery.25
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Green also lists the reasons why the opposition .garnered 
so much support in such little time. The religious opposition 
cast itself as an anti-Shah movement, rather than approaching 
potential adherents with a program or a positive message. The 
vague message appealed to all Iranians who were embittered by 
the regime. This led to a glossing over of ethnic, 
socioeconomic, educational, religious, and regional 
differences because of the common hatred of the Shah. The 
countermobilization in Iran included Iranians working for the 
government, as well as many lower level bureaucrats who simply 
moved over to the opposition. Finally, because the revolution 
had no real oppositional center, the regime could not crush 
it. Its personal attacks against Khomeini simply increased 
popular support for the cleric.26
After the revolution, according to Green, Iranian society 
demobilized. Structural differences which had been ignored 
resurfaced. Ethnic and religious minorities reverted to their 
traditional rivalry for resources while attempting to maintain 
their autonomy.27 In essence, the simplification of politics 
which permitted countermobilization dissipated after the 
revolution.
II. Models of Spiritual and Cultural Crisis
John Esposito and Alan Taylor put forward the alternative 
theory that the Iranian revolution and Islamic protest 
movements in general have their roots in reaction to the moral 
failure of the secular state.28
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John Esposito qualifies his analysis of the resurgence of 
Islam with the admonition that the causes are many and should 
be "appreciated within the contexts of individual countries 
and regions."29 Nevertheless, he lists some causes that 
pervade the Muslim experience. Contemporary Muslims suffer 
from an identity crisis stemming from a sense of failure— in 
the context of the Arab loss in the Six Day War and of the 
secular-nationalist experiment— and lack of self-esteem. They 
are disillusioned with the West and the failure of the western 
systems of government in muslim nations. They also find pride 
in the military success of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the 
oil embargo of the same year which deeply hurt western 
economies, and the Iranian revolution. Finally, contemporary 
Muslims are searching for an identity beyond emulation of the 
West. They yearn for the authenticity and simplicity of their 
Islamic past.
These feelings transcend socio-economic barriers. The 
1967 war is remembered as "the disaster," a defeat which 
seemed to many to indicate that God was no longer with His 
community.30 Religious leaders argued that it was not God 
who had abandoned Muslims, but rather Muslims who had strayed 
from the straight path. Revivalism answered the questions 
also of westernized intellectuals and elites who could not 
understand the failure of modernization to meet their 
societies' needs. Both traditional religious leaders and the 
western elite decried the failure of western models of 
development. It did not help that governments with pseudo-
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democratic facades really maintained authoritarian- control 
over Muslim societies.
While the 197 3 war against Israel was no victory, it 
demonstrated the strength of the Egyptian army. Furthermore, 
the use of Islamic symbolism in the war led to its remembrance 
as a religious war. The oil embargo by the petroleum 
producing states showed that Muslim states were a force to be 
reckoned with. Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the United Arab 
Emirates supported Islamic organizations and development 
projects throughout the Muslim world. Finally, the Iranian 
revolution in 1978-79 seemed to prove that Muslims could 
mobilize to restore Islam to the state and live free from 
dependency on the West. Islamic movements in Sunni and Shii 
countries alike believed that the Iranian revolution was a 
harbinger and a model for the Muslim world.31
In another work, Esposito explains how the revivalist 
movements have progressed toward political activism to bring 
about their Islamic state. Increasingly alienated from the 
state, which may use violence to suppress them or religious 
imagery to coopt them, militants justify their struggle
against the secular state with several basic claims:
1. Muslim's [sic] have a God-ordained purpose and 
vocation, that is, submission to and realization of 
God's will, which governs both individual and 
community life.
2. The correct path for society or Shariah is contained 
in the Quran and Sunnah.
3. Islam is a total way of life that embraces religion 
and politics, state and society.
4. An Islamic state must be established.
5. It is imperative that the Shariah be implemented,
replacing existing Western-inspired legal codes.
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6. The westernization of Muslim society and its-Western 
models for modernization are condemned because they 
have failed and are thus responsible for political 
corruption, economic decline, social injustice, and 
spiritual malaise, just like the pre-Islamic period 
of ignorance.
7. A Western Judeo-Christian conspiracy pits the West 
against the East.
8. Governments such as Egyptfs that do not follow the 
Shariah are illegitimate. Those guilty of 
unbelief, "atheist states," are lawful objects of
j ihad.
9. Muslims are obliged both to overthrow such 
governments and to fight those Muslims who do not 
share the "total commitment" of militants.
10. Jihad against unbelievers is a religious duty.
11. Non-Muslims are no longer considered "People of the 
Book" but rather unbelievers. Thus non-Muslim 
minorities, such as the Copts, are persecuted.
12. The official ulama are rejected for their tendency 
to downplay the meaning of jihad as armed struggle. 
They have succumbed to the West and have been co­
opted by the government.
13. The majority of mosques that are state supported and 
controlled are places of unbelief because God’s will 
and the Prophet’s teachings are not upheld there.32
There is very little mention of any structural reason for
opposing the state. Rather, the focus is on the moral
imperative of returning to true Islam and the spiritual peace
ensuing from this return.
While Alan Taylor mentions some structural grievances 
held by the revolutionaries in Iran, his analysis focuses on 
the anti-Western aspect of the Islamic opposition. Not only 
was the Shah pro-West, but he attempted to deemphasize the 
Islamic culture of Iran in favor of reinforcing national 
identity and even the pre- Islamic character of the monarchy 
at his 1971 celebration at Persepolis ,33 Thus not only did 
the traditional masses espouse the cause of the religious 
opposition, but the westernized elites, in rejecting the Shah,
18
reidentified with Islam.34 Ayatollah Khomeini accused the 
Shah of disliking traditional Iranian culture, of
collaborating with the United States at the expense of Iran, 
of corruption, and of exploiting the Iranian people. These 
are all moral offenses.35
III. Revivalism as a Response to Structural and Spiritual
Malaise
A few scholars have sought to reconcile the structural 
and cultural or spiritual arguments to provide a more
comprehensive approach to explaining the rise of Islamic 
protest movements. Alan Taylor is among them, as is Ami 
Ay a Ion.36
Alan Taylor emphasizes that the corruption and
dissolution of the Pahlavi regime made the structural problems 
in Iran seem like insults to the people. The traditional 
balance between the government and the religious institutions 
had been upset by the Shah. He was attempting to change the 
basic structure of society, and at the same time altered the 
political structure of Iran. Moreover, the Shah had promised 
modernization for all and had not met the expectations of 
most, while upsetting their traditional way of life. The
Iranians were disillusioned and unhappy with westernization, 
not only because they yearned for Islam and tradition, but 
because it had altered their lives in a negative manner.
Ami Ayalon puts forward a more convincing combination of 
structural and spiritual/cultural reasons leading to the rise
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of Islamic revivalist movements, specifically in Egypt. He 
argues that it is precisely because the crisis is two-fold, 
material and spiritual, that the Islamic challenge may prove 
dangerous for the Egyptian regime.37
According to Ayalon, Egypt's socioeconomic crisis stems 
from the paucity of arable land and the rapid expansion of the 
population. Combined with an inefficient and insufficient 
economic structure which makes Egypt dependent on foreign aid, 
notably from the United States, the crisis creates a huge 
foreign debt and an economy of need, rather than of supply and 
demand. A general sense of socioeconomic malaise results from 
periodic shortages of food, scarcity of housing, unemployment, 
poor public services, and the large gap between the minority 
of wealthy Egyptians and the majority of the population. The 
government is entangled in subsidies, which the United States 
and organizations supplying aid to Egypt have pressured Hosni 
Mubarak to eliminate.
The hidden economy and regional interest in Egyptian 
stability contribute to the continuity of the regime, as did 
the elimination by the United States and many allies of large 
portions of the Egyptian debt in exchange for support during 
the Gulf War. Nevertheless, the feeling of dependency 
remains, as does the spiritual-ideological dilemma, which 
Ayalon describes as a "crisis of disorientation." Why hasn't 
Egypt carved a more important niche in the world after several 
decades of independence? The failure of pan-Arabism and the 
obvious corruption of the ideals of socioeconomic justice have
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led many to question the validity of secular nationalist 
concepts. One of their options, by far the most popular 
according to Ayalon, is Islamic revivalism. But Ayalon 
believes that the Islamic revivalist movement "is not a 
socioeconomic protest movement which happens to phrase its 
complaint in Islamic terms... Rather, it is a religious 
movement which is gaining ground due to socioeconomic and 
spiritual circumstances."38
Pahlavi Iran and Contemporary Egypt;
Similar Problems. Different Circumstances
In many ways, the debate between the structuralists and 
spiritualists boils down to the question about the chicken and 
the egg. Which came first, structural dislocation, or 
yearning for a spiritual renewal? But the point on which they 
agree is that the presence of Islamic revivalist movements in 
states suffering from attendant structural problems can be 
problematic for the stability of the state.
This quickly-drawn conclusion suffers from the attention 
of scholars to the structural and spiritual causes of Islamic 
revivalism rather than on the effects of the revivalist 
movements on politics in the state. By studying the effects 
of Islamic revival movements, one might be able to trace a 
pattern of alienation leading to anti-regime violence in a 
particular state. But because the only contemporary Islamic 
revolution occurred in Iran, many scholars study the Iranian
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revolution in order to predict the next revolution in the 
Muslim world.
In the euphoria following the revolution in Iran, 
Ayatollah Khomeini declared that the revolution was an 
Islamic, not just a Shii, revolution.39 Despite the initial 
admiration for the Iranian revolution and its leader in parts 
of the Muslim world, no other country has followed suit with 
an Islamic revolution of its own. Most notably, Egypt, with 
a past so similar to Iran's and a large network of established 
Islamic protest movements, maintains a secular nationalist 
government.
I. Iran and Egypt; Patterns of Similarity
The most striking similarities between pre-revolutionary 
Iran and Egypt lie both in the structure of their society and 
in the rejection of westernization in favor of the puritanical 
and nativistic values of Islam. Both Egypt and Iran fit 
Christopher Clapham's model of the neo-patrimonial state. 
Clapham has defined a neo-patrimonial state as one in which 
rational-legal structures inherited from the former colonial 
power are laid on top of a grid of relationships from the 
traditional patrimonial system.40 The pattern of feudal 
relationships, of which corruption and patronage are two 
integral components, affects the behavior of bureaucrats in 
the state towards each other and towards those outside 
government.41
Public positions become platforms for the accumulation of
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personal power. The behavior of people in public office takes 
on the quality of displaying this status rather than 
performing the duties associated with the position. This 
results in a government bureaucracy riddled with inefficiency.
Neo-patrimonial states are also characterized by 
corruption, which emerges as a result of 11 the weakness of 
accountability by the governors to the governed."42 The lack 
of accountability can be related to the social distance 
between the western educated elite in government and the 
masses, and the institutionalized inequalities of power within 
the hierarchical structure of the state. Often, a corrupt 
regime is also externally buttressed by its international 
patrons. So far, one can relate the above-mentioned 
characteristics of the neo-patrimonial state to both pre­
revolutionary Iran and Egypt, following the evidence presented 
by Abrahamian, Green, Khoury, and Esposito.
Clapham differentiates between two types of corruption, 
parochial and extractive. Parochial corruption, the less 
disruptive of the two to society, involves the redistribution 
of resources and benefits within the community. Extractive 
corruption exists on a larger scale, "rests on the 
manipulation of state power, and maintains the lifestyle of a 
privileged class of state employees."43 Extractive
corruption erodes public trust in authorities, while 
contributing to a lack of shared sense of values. Thus when 
the community is no longer receiving adequate resources and 
benefits from its patron, it becomes distrustful of the state
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and alienated from it.
Patron-client relationships are established by those in 
power to maintain power. The patron provides physical or 
legal protection, employment, property, economic development, 
even religious intercession. The client responds with 
military service, voting, labor, and information. A society 
characterized by patron-client relations, whether between the 
state and the people within the hierarchy of state 
institutions, is a society deeply divided between superiors 
and inferiors, but also within classes.44
Patron-client organization of a society, according to 
Clapham, most characterizes the Third World states where a 
competitive party system has emerged since independence. In 
such a society, the party leadership is obligated as a patron 
to look out for the interests of its constituent group. It 
comes to be regarded as the legitimate leadership of that 
group, regardless of the obvious difference in class and 
wealth. Thus the patron-client relationship maintains the 
patron class in power while also minimizing the issue of class 
in political conflicts.
Although pre-revolutionary Iran did not function along 
the lines of a pluralistic political system in a formal sense, 
it had experimented with multi-party politics in the 1950's 
through the nationalist and communist parties. Moreover, 
trade organizations provided opportunities for citizens' 
voices to be heard, as did the state-subsidized Shii 
hierarchy. However, the cooptation of westernized elites by
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the Shah, his consolidation of political power, and his 
crackdown on both the bazaar organizations and the religious 
establishment denied Iranians any effective means of 
opposition.
Patron-client relationships are based on inherent 
inequalities between the partners, and their benefits to the 
partners are uneven. Furthermore, patron-client relationships 
exacerbate the problems already present in Third World states, 
namely corruption, the inefficient allocation of resources, 
ethnic and religious conflicts, and the unaccountability of 
the state. A participant in a patron-client relationship 
looks to the system and the state for the satisfaction of a 
private benefit rather than a public need.45 When, in the 
case of pre-revolutionary Iran or contemporary Egypt, it seems 
that the state no longer satisfies the private benefits of 
most citizens, it becomes a public crisis. If someone can 
organize, politicize, and mobilize the dissatisfied citizens, 
the crisis becomes generalized to a crisis of the state.
Most importantly, a neo-patrimonial state in which 
corruption and patron-client relations are the norm cannot 
claim the legitimacy that a modern rational-legal state can. 
If the vulnerability of the client decreases, the client may 
remove himself or herself from the relationship and look for 
more objectively efficient institutions through which to 
pursue interests. The more likely scenario in the case of 
neo-patrimonial countries, argues Clapham, is that despairing 
clients may follow "some new and revolutionary path, which
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will also be based on universalistic" values.46 .It seems 
that in the case of Egypt and pre-revolutionary Iran, the new 
and revolutionary path is not radical communism but Islam.
Egypt and pre-revolutionary Iran equally fit the 
description of a neo-patrimonial state. One can argue that in 
pre-revolutionary Iran, neo-patrimonialism came to be rejected 
for a number of reasons stemming from the socioeconomic 
failure of the regime and the malaise brought on by the 
dislocation of traditions. In its place, Islamic revivalists 
sought to institute a state which would meet the needs of the 
people without promoting the inequalities that a patron-client 
relationship does.
The rational-legal structures which the Pahlavis adopted 
after their accession to power were discarded in favor of 
Islamic law, the Sharia. The monarchy and its extensive 
bureaucracy were replaced by a theocracy, headed by an Imam, 
whose authority derived legitimacy from the hierarchy of Shii 
Islam and the myth of the seventh Imam. The secular state, 
which had failed to meet the employment, educational, health 
and religious needs of individuals, while attacking those 
which opposed it, was replaced by the Islamic state which 
purported to bring the Umma back and the golden age of Islam 
with it.47
Whether or not the Iranian revolution has met these goals 
does not concern us. However, it seems clear that Iranians 
revolted against a system which denied them socio-economic 
security, and political participation, while robbing them of
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their traditional religion and culture. Increasingly 
nepotistic and corrupt, the Shah's regime was no longer able 
or willing, as a patron, to provide for its client classes. 
By alienating prosperous clients like the bazaaris, the Shah 
freed them from their obligations to the state. They then 
looked to the clerics to fulfill the needs that the state had 
not.
In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak's presidency, like Anwar Sadat's 
before him, has been accused of corruption and nepotism. This 
is ironic considering Mubarak's pledge to clean up Egyptian 
politics upon his accession to the presidency. Moreover, 
population growth and the lack of employment available to 
university-educated Egyptians exacerbates the pressures on 
Mubarak to meet their socio-economic needs.
While Mubarak has made some efforts toward providing a 
more pluralistic forum for expression, a generation has grown 
up having had access to university education in rural areas 
yet not finding employment in Cairo. The newly urbanized, 
educated youth provide fertile recruiting pools for the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) and other, more militant 
organizations like the Islamic Liberation Organization 
(Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami), the Society of Muslims 
(Jamaat al-Muslimin), and the Holy War Organization 
(Munazzamat al-Jihad).48 Mamoun Fandy describes the
patronage system in Egypt as a system which favors the Cairene 
over the rural Egyptian. He writes,
This network begins at the highest level of the Egyptian
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government. It is widely known in Egypt that the 
government is controlled by Mubarakfs in-laws. Thus the 
Islamists [sic] emphasis on brotherhood is a mirror image 
of the family-centered Egyptian power elite.49
Following Anwar Sadat*s assassination in 1981 by members
of the Holy War Organization, or al-Jihad, Hosni Mubarak
attempted to improve the government's relations with Islamic
organizations. He lifted the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood's
participation in politics, though they were still not
permitted to form their own party. He freed Muslim
Brotherhood leaders and other moderate Islamic revivalists.50
In 1984, the Muslim Brotherhood allied with the Wafd, or
nationalist, party to contest the parliamentary elections.
The alliance won 12 seats in the People's Assembly.51
In the election of 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood allied
itself with two secular parties, the Socialist Labor Party and
the Liberal Party. Under the banner of an "Islamic alliance,"
they obtained 20 more seats for the Brotherhood in the
People's Assembly.52 Following the declaration by Egypt's
High Constitutional Court that the electoral law under which
the People's Assembly had been elected was unconstitutional,
Mubarak dissolved the People's Assembly.53 The subsequent
elections were boycotted by almost all the opposition parties,
including the Muslim Brotherhood.
Mubarak's manipulation of the Higher Constitutional
Court, his creation of new electoral laws to keep political
opposition out of the People's Assembly, his reversal of
policy on the Islamicist issue, the imprisonment and torture
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of several militant Islamicists, and the ruling National 
Democratic Party's control over the patronage system all hark 
back to Clapham's neo-patrimonial system.
Similarly, the Shah manipulated politics in Iran 
throughout his reign. In 1953, he allied with the CIA to 
overthrow then prime minister Muhammad Mosaddeq, a nationalist 
who undermined the Shah by advocating the nationalization of 
the Iranian oil industry.54 The Shah then set about 
destroying all opposition to the monarchy with the support of 
the United States and the CIA trained SAVAK. They began with 
the Tudeh party, the communist party of Iran, which sustained 
such a severe blow from repeated arrests, torture, 
executions, and cooptation that by the mid 1950's, it barely 
maintained an underground. The National Front, the party of 
Muhammad Mosaddeq, though not persecuted quite as forcefully, 
suffered consistent harassment and monitoring, which created 
a much quieter, more careful opposition. The religious 
right's leading ayatollahs were also pressured into supporting 
the regime.55
Experimenting with a state-controlled two party system 
throughout the 1950's, the Shah dissolved parliament in 1961, 
reinstating it with handpicked appointees soon afterward. His 
pattern of control over the political participation of 
Iranians continued into the 1970's, when human rights abuses 
became so obvious that even prime minister Hoveyda and the 
Shah had to admit that torture occurred in Iranian prisons. 
The government's security forces were especially thorough in
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their assault on the religious establishment. James Bill 
writes,
In their crushing attack on Shi*ism, the shah's 
government closed down the publishing houses that 
produced books on religion and social problems. SAVAK 
infiltrated mosque meetings and prayer sessions and 
disbanded religious student organizations on campuses 
throughout Iran. The government arrested, interrogated, 
imprisoned, tortured, and even executed large numbers of 
clerics.56
The elimination of any avenue of political expression—  
and opposition— culminated in the formation of the Rastakhiz 
party in 1977. The Shah ordered all Iranians to join the 
party, intending to abolish all other intermediary groups like 
student unions, bazaar trade guilds and religious societies. 
When it became obvious, in 1978, that the single party was all 
that the Shah was offering Iranians in the way of 
participatory mechanisms, Iranians drew their battle lines.
Like pre-revolutionary Iran, Egypt suffers from 
structural problems in its economy and society. The 
historical origins of these problems can be found in the first 
revolution which nominally restored independence to Egypt from 
Great Britain in 1922. Under Gamal Abdal Nasser, it seemed 
that Egypt was destined to become one of the most important 
players in regional politics. Secular nationalist ideology 
promised the benefits of modernization without dependency on 
the West.
However, the promises of military greatness and economic 
independence grew stale when unemployment, urban crowding, 
uneven income distribution, nepotism, corruption, and defeat
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at the hands of Israel came about in the late 196Q's. At 
present, Egypt must import 50 to 70 percent of its food and 
inflation makes it very difficult for the poor to keep up.57 
But the poor are not the only ones disillusioned with the 
unfulfilled promises, and the population continues to grow 
beyond the resources of the state.
Meanwhile, political participation is limited. While far 
less authoritarian than the Shah, Mubarak maintains control 
over the political structures in Egypt. Like all the 
presidents before him, Mubarak, as a former member of the 
armed forces, can count on their support in quelling unrest. 
In exchange, the president perpetuates the special position 
and privileges of the military, mindful of their role in 
overthrowing previous Egyptian rulers.
The cabinet is firmly under the presidents control. Its 
primary function is to implement policy through the large and 
unwieldy civil bureaucracy which controls most of the 
country's daily affairs.
The regime also retains control over the legislature, in 
both the People's Assembly and the Consultative Council. The 
People's Assembly is the state's chief legislative body, also 
designated in the constitution as a forum for discussion 
between the government and the opposition. Its members, 
unlike those of the Consultative Council, are all elected. 
But because the governing National Democratic Party holds a 
large majority of the seats, the parliament in Egypt often 
simply sanctions government policy.58
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The judiciary is perhaps the most independent and 
respected institution in Egypt. Unlike his predecessors, 
Mubarak has complied with the court's decisions. His greater 
fault may be in complying too quickly, as in the instance when 
the election laws were declared unconstitutional, which 
permitted Mubarak simply to dissolve parliament and call new 
elections.
Mubarak has expanded the multi-party system first allowed 
by Anwar Sadat. Parties are free to organize, compete in 
parliamentary elections, even publish their own newspapers. 
The National Democratic Party, the successor of the now 
defunct Arab Socialist Union, represents the government. Its 
chairman is Hosni Mubarak. Its other important posts are held 
by ministers and state officials. State officials also 
administer elections. In a nation where the state has always 
been identified with the president in power, it is difficult 
to vote against the president's party. Thus while Egypt may 
offer its citizens more official political organs of 
participation than pre-revolutionary Iran, it does not 
guarantee that in the final analysis, the opposition will be 
given as much regard as the government's party.
Moreover, Egypt is experiencing much the same spiritual 
crisis as did pre-revolutionary Iran. Like the Iranians who 
decried the moral decay of society due to the westernization 
of the elite's and the regime's values, Egyptians have lost 
their shared sense of values with their leadership.59 This 
particular component of Clapham's model of the neo-patrimonial
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state rings true for both Iran and Egypt, through the obvious 
abandonment of secular nationalism by a large segment of 
Egypt*s educated youth in favor of Islamic revivalist 
movements.60
Not only have disillusioned and marginalized newly 
urbanized university students and graduates joined the Islamic 
movement, but many professionals, bureaucrats, and even 
members of the military have become members of Islamic 
revivalist movements. It is in the movements themselves that 
the greatest differences between the Iranian and the Egyptian 
Islamic opposition can be seen.
II. Islamic Revival Movements: the Core and the Factions
Puritanical Muslim opposition to a state perceived as 
overly secular or atheistic finds its roots in the literature 
documenting the overthrow of the Umayyad caliphate in the mid­
eighth century by the Abbasids. Two competing schools of 
thought emerged on the legality of revolt. The group 
supporting the ousted Umayyads, sometimes called the Nabita, 
or young upstarts, claimed that any disobedience to the legal 
ruler is wrong. The duty of the Muslim is to obey the Caliph 
in order to avoid fitna. or chaos. This has been the orthodox 
approach to politics in Islam, both Sunni and Shii. The 
second school of thought, represented by the writer and 
philosopher al-Jahiz, maintains that it is the duty of the 
Muslim to resist and depose an impious ruler, when that ruler 
is "neglecting his duties and abusing his powers as a
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sovereign.1161
The basis for this interpretation of the political duties 
of the Muslim, used by all of the Islamic revival groups to 
justify their political opposition to the state, can be found 
in two of the Prophet Muhammad*s sayings, or hadith: "There
is no [duty of] obedience in sin," and "Do not obey a creature 
against his Creator." These two sayings seem to signal the 
Prophet*s permission to disobey the Imam, the head of the 
Islamic community-state, in the instance where the Imam 
demands something from his subjects which is contrary to God's 
law.
Nevertheless, the orthodox interpretation of these two 
sayings has been that disobedience should happen only in the 
most extreme cases. In all other cases, in fact in most other 
cases, obedience and quietism are urged in the name of order 
and the preservation of the Umma. The message of quietism was 
accepted far more extensively in the Muslim world than was 
that of duty of disobedience. The recurring theme has been 
instead the duty to avoid fitna, the "disruption of religious, 
social and political order leading to chaos."62
This debate was therefore short-lived and limited for the 
most part to the Sunni tradition. Nevertheless, in this 
debate lie the roots and the justification used by both the 
Shii opposition in Iran and the various Sunni opposition 
groups in Egypt and other countries. In order to understand 
the arguments of the Islamic revival groups, it is necessary 
to explore in more depth the differences between the Sunni and
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Shii branches of Islam.
A. Iran: the Shii Establishment
The greatest schism in Islam's history was based on 
political differences between the partisans of Ali —  the 
prophet's cousin and son-in-law —  as a successor to Muhammad, 
and those who followed the elected caliphs. The partisans of 
Ali, or Shiat Ali. believed that he was a more legitimate 
successor to Muhammad than the caliphs on the basis of his 
blood relationship to the prophet, but also on the basis of 
his personal piety. The descendants of Ali came to be the 
political opponents of Muawiya, the founder of the Umayyad 
Caliphate.63
Also important in popular Shii history is the story of 
Ali's two sons, Huseyn and Hassan. Muawiya, founder of the 
Umayyad dynasty, allegedly promised Hassan that he would 
become the next caliph. Instead, he had him poisoned. Huseyn 
survived his brother, fighting the caliphate until Yazid, the 
son of Muawiya, killed him at Karbala. Karbala is now one of 
the pilgrimage sites of Shii Islam.
Although the popular practice of Shii Islam includes 
mourning for Huseyn's martyrdom and asking for his 
intercession during the month of Muharram, he has not 
traditionally been a figure who incites people to revolution. 
As a matter of fact, Shii Islam has made a doctrine out of 
quietism and acceptance of the de facto separation of politics 
and religion. However, in his rhetoric against the Shah, 
Ayatollah Khomeini frequently cast himself as Huseyn and the
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Shah as Yazid.64
Shii Islam is divided into several conflicting factions. 
The form of Shii Islam which most Iranians follow is 1 Twelver 
Shiism', a doctrine which traces the line of Imams from Ali 
down to his twelfth descendant. The twelfth Imam remains 
hidden, to return one day as the messiah, or mahdi. to bring 
the world into the age of true Islam.65 The hidden nature of 
the twelfth Imam does not mean that he has abandoned his 
followers. Rather, he is communicating his spiritual guidance 
to them through learned men— ulama in Arabic, ayatollah or 
muitahid in farsi— who authorize their followers to obey the 
government even if it is not legitimate. The doctrine of the 
hidden Imam implies that all will be set right when he 
returns.66
Twelver Shiis believe that they must obey the decrees of 
particular ayatollahs until the hidden Imam returns. They 
also believe that one particular mujtahid should claim the 
allegiance of all other mujtahids. This source of imitation 
emerges by consensus from other mujtahids by virtue of his 
great piety and writings. There is supposed to be only one at 
any given time. Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the source of 
imitation during the late 1970's, when the usually quietist 
Shii establishment and citizenry followed him to revolution.
The mujtahids or ayatollahs are also venerated as 
charismatic leaders. This veneration derives especially from 
the popular conception of ayatollahs as "sacred deputies of a 
supernatural being," the hidden Imam. Ayatollah Khomeini's
36
charisma, perhaps in contrast to the hatred which the Shah 
inspired among his subjects, grew to proportions unknown 
previously even in Shii Islam.67
Not only do the Shii ayatollahs hold the veneration and 
admiration of Shiis, but they also benefit from 
institutionalized means of support, independent from any 
government. Ayatollahs receive a customary tax on the incomes 
of their followers. This tax, the khums, usually amounts to 
5 percent of each follower's income.68 Since each Shii is 
supposedly attached to one particular ayatollah, it follows 
that the clerics manage financial independence, to a certain 
extent, from the government. However, the state also finances 
the religious establishment, in the hopes of keeping it loyal.
Khomeini also had considerable access to the 
infrastructure of the religious and secular opposition from 
his exile in Iraq and then France. He used the mosques to 
reach them and give them political direction. He used the 
leftist factions and educated youth to spread his teachings in 
the universities and among the elites. He also used tape 
recorders and even the BBC to broadcast his intentions to the 
Iranian people.69
Ayatollah Khomeini's charisma played a crucial role in 
bringing together the dissatisfied and polarized segments of 
Iranian society. His charisma and his inherent legitimacy as 
a mujtahid, envoy of the hidden Imam, allowed him to mobilize 
Iranians whose instincts might have led them to wait out the 
crisis.
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Finally, the popular conception of the messianic Imam 
returning to his people to lead them into an era of pure Islam 
had galvanized many uneducated Iranians. Among the anti- 
American and anti-Shah slogans that the crowds chanted on the 
famous Ashura march (December 11, 1978) were paeans to
Ayatollah Khomeini's saintliness.70 To many, the ayatollah 
had become the Imam. This exemplifies the extent to which the 
revolution was understood to be a return to the Islamic umma.
B. Egypt; Factionalized Sunni Militants and Discredited
Ulama
The majority of Egyptians are Sunni Muslims, the orthodox 
branch of Islam to which 85 percent of the world's Muslims 
belong. The Islamic revivalist movements derive their 
philosophies, on the whole, from the appeal of puritanical 
Islam as an answer to the material and spiritual crises of 
contemporary Egypt. The many movements agree that Egyptian 
society has fallen into moral decay, that the state no longer 
provides for Egyptians adequately, and that foreign pressures 
on the culture and the economy of Egypt must be repelled. In 
order to restore stability, a Muslim government dispensing 
Sharia law must replace the secular government of Egypt. It 
is the duty of all Muslims to strive toward replacing the 
secular government, which is promoting this fitna, with an 
Islamic government that will bring back the Umma. On all 
these points, the diverse Islamic revivalist movements in 
Egypt manage to agree.
In many ways, the Islamic revivalist movements remain
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divided. First, in their approach to the society in which 
they live, but also in the way they strive to bring about the 
Umma, their attitudes toward establishment Sunni Islam and the 
ulama of Egypt, and in their attitudes toward their own 
leaders— in all these ways the many Islamic movements in Egypt 
have interpreted the Quran and the Sunna differently.
Scholars have counted 29 different Islamic revivalist 
groups in Egypt. These include the groups which possess 
viability and disruptive potential. Egyptian authorities have 
counted as many as ninety-nine, many of which are discovered 
and contained or suppressed periodically by the government.71
The most important movements, mentioned earlier, remain 
the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin), the Islamic 
Liberation Organization (Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami), the 
Society of Muslims (Jamaat al-Muslimin, also known as Takfir 
wal-Hijra), and the Holy War Organization (Munazzamat al- 
Jihad, also known as New Jihad).
The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest, and most moderate, 
of these organizations. It was founded in 1928 by Hasan al- 
Banna, a teacher from Ismailiyya, with the twofold goal of 
liberating the Islamic nation from foreign powers and creating 
a free Islamic state in its place.72 The ILO, the Society of 
Muslims, and the HWO derived their philosophies from the 
original goals of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, their 
membership and tactics reflect a higher level of militancy 
drawn from the writings of Sayyid Qutb, a revivalist who 
joined the Muslim Brotherhood after the death of Hasan al-
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Banna.73 Al-Banna wanted to bring Egypt out from under 
imperialist domination and away from the spell of westernism. 
He warned against the appeal of secular nationalism, a western 
concept, arguing that a better conception of one's identity 
lay within the Islamic Umma.74
The Muslim Brotherhood has retained the anti-western bent 
of al-Banna's original ideology. But from the underground 
organization of its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
emerged as the largest, best-known and most established 
Islamic revival movement in Egypt. The mission of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, like that of other revival movements in Egypt, is 
to bring Islam back into the apparatus of the state in order 
to create the Umma. But unlike most of the other 
organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood proposes to achieve the 
transformation of the state through a jihad based on education 
and political participation rather than on violent action.75
The Muslim Brotherhood survived the repression of the 
movement throughout the Nasser and Sadat years, when the 
leadership and the members spent many years in prison. 
Originally militant, it emerged in the late 1970's and early 
1980's as a more moderate voice of Islamic revivalism. 
Moderation of its ideology has resulted in more lenient 
treatment from the government. The Muslim Brotherhood 
publishes its own magazines, through which it continues its 
propaganda against the secular state. It also participates in 
politics, even, as mentioned earlier, winning seats in 
parliament.
40
The particular focus of the Muslim Brotherhood's 
hostility is the secular nationalist state, which the 
Brotherhood's ideologues see as a western construct dividing 
the universal Islamic Umma. Sayyid Qutb, one of the most 
militant ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood, identified the 
secular nationalist state as equivalent to the iahili state, 
the barbaric pre-Islamic state of Arabia. He noted that 
jahili states are governed by political systems based on 
servitude, "one man's lordship over another," echoing the 
earlier analysis of Egypt as a neo-patrimonial state.76
Sayyid Qutb's writings convey hostility toward the West, 
and in general a militant attitude toward bringing the secular 
state back to Islam. His most lasting contribution to the 
ideology of Islamic revival groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and 
its more militant offshoots, lies in his interpretation of the 
concept of jihad. According to Qutb, the Islamic Umma will 
not come about through mass movement but rather through the 
hard work of an elite of dedicated Muslims. The ultimate goal 
of the elite is to establish "al Hakimmiyyah— the reign of 
Allah's sovereignty on earth to end all sin, suffering, and 
repression.1,77
The literal interpretation of jihad as active struggle 
and the concept of the elite of muslims, or vanguard, are the 
focal points of disagreement among the various revivalist 
groups. Qutb did not provide guidelines to differentiate 
between the elite and those who belonged to jahiliyya society. 
Some of his writings can be interpreted to advocate the
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separation of the true Muslims, those who form the vanguard of 
Islamic revivalism, from jahiliyya society, following the 
example of the Prophet Muhammad and his flight to Medina (the 
hijra).
But Qutb did not make it clear whether he was
recommending physical or spiritual removal from society. He
also did not explicitly condemn as impious Muslims those who
chose not to join revivalist groups, although he maintained
the necessity of separation from jahiliyya society. The
Muslim Brotherhood has chosen to interpret his call to jihad
in light of the Quranic verse (16:125),
Call unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair 
exhortation, and reason with them in the better way. Lo! 
thy Lord is best aware of him who strayeth from His way 
and He is Best Aware of those who go aright.78
The leaders of the Islamic Liberation Organization (ILO),
however, read Qutb literally. They command jihad against the
regime, in the form of a coup to bring Muslim leadership to
the government. Egyptian society, according to the Islamic
Liberation Organization, will be reformed from above. The
prison experience, rather than cooling their fervor, rendered
them more determined than ever to use violent means to
overthrow the government.79 They were also galvanized by
Sayyid Qutb's example, his execution by the Egyptian state in
19 67 providing them with a model of martyrdom.80
ILO members also perceive the Muslim Brotherhood as too
complacent and the ulama as coopted by the government. Since
it is the religious duty of the Muslim to see that a truly
42
Islamic social order comes about, Muslims must make sure that 
Sharia law is implemented as quickly as possible. To do so, 
one may use any means, including modern ones.81 The ILO thus 
infiltrated the military and other government institutions in 
order to spring into action whenever an opportunity arose. 
Its leader, Salih Siriyya, advised caution and patience. 
Members outvoted him. This resulted in the attempted coup 
against Anwar Sadat in 1974.82
The activist orientation of the ILO is markedly different 
from that of the Society of Muslims. The Society of Muslims, 
though also veterans of a prison experience, and founded by a 
former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, believe that the 
whole of society is jahili, or barbaric. The change must not 
come from the top, but rather from the bottom up. The elite 
of Muslims, in order to bring about the Muslim state, must 
emulate the life of the Prophet every step of the way. 
Therefore, like Muhammad in the face of jahili Mecca, Muslims 
must follow their leader, Shukri Mustafa, and withdraw from 
jahili society. In their mini-society, they live according to 
the laws of Islam, gaining strength until they can return to 
deal the death knell to jahili society.83
The leader of the Society of Muslims, Shukri Mustafa, 
believed that everything that came after the Quran and the 
accounts of the tradition of the Prophet (Surma) was tainted 
by interpretation. Therefore the four major schools of law in 
Sunni Islam are invalid, which makes establishment Islam, and 
ulama, illegitimate. Mustafa also believed that the jurists
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who developed the four schools of law did so to limit the
ability of Muslims to interpret the verses of the Quran for
themselves. They dared to come between God and his
worshippers, which placed them squarely outside the bounds of
Islam. Therefore they were jahili.84
Moreover, the ulama did not obfuscate the Quran merely to
shore up their own power but also to issue fatwas to fit the
views of the sovereign. He offered the example of Sheikh Suad
Jalal of the University of al-Azhar, who proclaimed that beer
did not fall under the prohibition of alcohol.85 Therefore,
not only were the ulama assisting illegitimate rulers, but
they were spreading sin. As a result, the Society of Muslims
is quite strongly opposed to establishment Islam.
Shukri Mustafafs violent dislike of the ulama was
paralleled by his disdain for formal education. Although he
had received a Bachelor's degree in Agriculture, Mustafa saw
the public education given by the state to Egyptians as
useless, in light of the underemployment of educated
Egyptians. He said in court,
The teaching of writing for its own sake is illicit... 
The Prophet did not open kuttab (Koranic schools) and 
institutions to teach Muslims writing and arithmetic, but 
permitted them to be taught according to needs and 
necessities.86
Some members of the Society of Muslims regarded Shukri 
Mustafa as the mahdi, or messiah. His autocratic leadership 
controlled every aspect of their lives, including marriage and 
employment.87 He was feared and respected by members of the 
Society of Muslims, who considered him an exemplary Muslim.
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Like Salih Siriyya, leader of the ILO, Shukri Mustafa was an 
educated charismatic leader whose organization survived his 
death.
The Islamic revival group which has had the most dramatic 
impact on Egypt's politics is the Holy War Organization, also 
known as al-Jihad. Al-Jihad members assassinated Anwar Sadat 
on the sixth of October 1981. Their leadership, organization, 
and tactics are quite different from the ILO's and the Society 
of Muslims'.
The members of the Holy War Organization do not believe 
that Egyptian society is jahili. Rather, they see Egyptian 
society as mostly Muslim, but held hostage by an impious, or 
jahili, government. Instead of rejecting the interpretations 
of Islamic law offered by the four schools of Islam, the 
ideologue of the cell of the HWO that assassinated Sadat 
founded his arguments on the Traditions.88
This ideologue, Abd al-Salam Faraj, was an electrician 
who published a pamphlet describing The Hidden Imperative, a 
reference to jihad, which he believed to be the sixth pillar 
of Islam. He argues in this pamphlet that ulama have obscured 
the need for jihad through their calls for stability, in order 
to maintain the leadership of the impious government in power. 
In his pamphlet, Faraj also explains that other movements 
seeking to establish the Umma have failed. Therefore it is 
time for the removal of the apostate leaders from the head of 
the state. His pamphlet is focused on the political analysis 
of power and state rather than on society, which has been the
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focus of most of the other revival movements.89
In particular, Faraj focused on the scholar Ibn Taimiyya, 
a jurist from the 14th century whose writings include a 
condemnation of the Mongol rulers of Islamic lands for the 
imposition of non-Islamic codes of law, the vasa. on the 
Muslim population.90 Faraj found many similarities between 
the political situation described by Ibn Taimiyya and 
contemporary Egypt. He followed Ibn Taimiyya*s lead by 
advocating jihad against the non-Muslim ruler.
The Holy War Organization also differs from the Society 
of Muslims in its refusal to separate from society. Members 
of the HWO believe instead that only through mass 
participation after the coup can the Muslim order come about. 
They reflect this belief by infiltrating the military, 
security services, and other organs of government and also by 
their emphasis on consultative leadership rather than 
autocratic leadership.91
A ten-man consultative assembly leads the HWO, with a 
supervisory apparatus overseeing the combat wing, the 
operational support, and the propaganda of the organization. 
The organization trains its own soldiers in martial arts and 
conventional fighting. They also acquire weapons from the 
black market. Interestingly, the leaders of the HWO also rely 
on the fatwas of a Sheikh, or learned man of Islam, to justify 
their actions.92
Thus, while the members of the HWO believe in the 
imperative of jihad and the uselessness of ulama, they do not
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believe in the immorality of Egyptian society. They also do 
not follow one leader in a messianic manner but belong to 
different cells of an organization which consults its members 
before acting. Finally, they do not reject Muslim tradition 
as a whole, but only the politics of contemporary Egypt.
All four Islamic revival movements described above 
consider jihad a necessity, although they differ in their 
interpretation of the means of jihad. They also agree on the 
uselessness of establishment Islam ulama, although attitudes 
towards them range from the Muslim Brotherhood1s indifference 
to the Society of Muslims* outright hostility. While the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Society of Muslims follow a more 
autocratic leadership, which could be reflected in their 
models for an Islamic state, the Holy War Organization and the 
Islamic Liberation Organization are governed by more 
democratic consultative councils, which they would like to see 
in a Muslim state. Finally, the movements also disagree about 
the extent of the immorality of the society in Egypt, and 
whether the solution should come from the bottom up or through 
a coup d*etat, or even through withdrawal from contemporary 
society to a mini-society of utopian Muslims.
III. Regime Responses
In Egypt, throughout the presidencies of Sadat and 
Mubarak, the government has consistently responded to violence 
from Islamic revival groups with violently repressive 
measures, while allowing more moderate groups to express
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themselves. It is understood that the Islamic revival 
movement draws on an Egyptian tradition of faith and 
mysticism, and that it benefits from the present socio­
economic problems in Egypt.93 Mubarak*s government, though 
repressing violence, has allowed public debate about its 
decisions in Islamic newspapers and magazines and through 
participation in politics.
Nevertheless, Mubarak maintains control over both the 
state and the political participation of the citizens through 
his hold on the bureaucracy, the cabinet, and the Parliament. 
The failure of Nasserism and the discrediting of both Nasser 
and Sadat in the eyes of the Egyptian people have led Mubarak 
to keep a lower profile than his predecessors. He is not a 
charismatic leader, but a head of state. As such, he does not 
refer to the Egyptian people as his children, as Sadat did. 
He has also avoided the trap that the Shah fell into by 
identifying his personal power with the power of the state of 
Iran.
Mubarak has also responded to the pressure of the Islamic 
revival movements to take a sterner attitude toward Israel and 
forge better relations with the Arab world.94 This has 
earned him grudging acceptance by the moderate revivalists and 
the secular Left as well. Furthermore, Mubarak benefits from 
the support of ulama, who feel as threatened by some of the 
more radical revival movements as the state does.
Thus, although Mubarak's Egypt is experiencing a crisis, 
the prevalent attitude toward the president is indifference
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rather than hostility.95 Most Egyptians may be struggling, 
and the ideology of Islam proves appealing, but the avenues 
for expression have not been closed. Mubarak has been very 
careful about denigrating Islam. Only the radical groups 
whose violent tactics repulse the majority of Egyptians 
receive harsh treatment in the media. Moreover, the 
government acknowledges that the economy is in crisis, and has 
made some effort to remedy the problem. Meanwhile, cautious 
and limited democracy seems to placate all but the most 
radical elements of society.96
The Pahlavi response to the growing dissatisfaction in 
Iran differed from the moderate and careful response of the 
Mubarak regime. Any and all disagreement with the Iranian 
regime was illegal and amounted to personal treason against 
the Shah. Any attempt to participate in politics through any 
other organ than the Rastakhiz party was also considered 
treason.97 The Shah was the state and Iranians were expected 
to honor him as such.
When the Shah removed all the traditional anchors of 
Iranian society through his systematic campaigns against the 
Shii establishment, the bazaaris, and the nationalist parties, 
Iranians toppled him in order to topple the state. The 
polarization and mass politicization of Iranians probably 
would not have occurred to the same extent if the regime* s 
responses had not emphasized its disregard for the people.98
The only independent way to oppose the regime, after the 
Shah had tightened his control over the bureaucracy,
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institutions, and elites of Iran, was to follow the Shii 
clerics. They benefited from the wide network of popular 
support granted them through the khums and the personal 
allegiance to ayatollahs that most traditional Iranians still 
practiced. They presented the people of Iran with a simple 
oppositional message that was vague enough in content to have 
cross-ethnic and cross-generational appeal. Finally, they 
provided a charismatic leader whose legitimacy was untainted 
by involvement in government, and who could use the Shah's 
tactics against the opposition to cast him as Yazid, the evil 
tyrant of Shii history.
Whv the Islamic Revolution Was Confined to Iran
The political circumstances articulated above show that 
Pahlavi Iran and contemporary Egypt, though both neo- 
patrimonial states undergoing an Islamic revival, differ on 
other basic points. The Shah's blatant consolidation of power 
and personal wealth, as demonstrated in his celebration at 
Persepolis and the creation of the Rastakhiz party, are in 
marked contrast to Mubarak's low profile leadership and use of 
limited democracy. But the two states differ in other ways 
too.
The Shii population of Iran and the Sunni population of 
Egypt do not hold the same religious beliefs. While Shiism 
and Sunnism fall under the umbrella of Islam, the Shiis hold 
particular beliefs in the messianic Imam and in the
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infallibility of their ayatollahs which the Sunnis do not 
hold. This makes it difficult for the various Islamic revival 
movements to agree on a common leader and a common strategy.
Shiis, through their history, also hold the belief that 
they are the followers of Ali and his children, who were 
martyrized by the political establishment of Yazid. Sunnis, 
on the other hand, understand their history as one of 
political dominance. They feel very little historical 
affinity for martyrdom or political protest. While they are 
willing to maintain themselves separate from the secular, 
western mode of life that they perceive as corrupt, most 
practicing Sunnis shy away from active struggle in the form of 
j ihad.
The ulama are religious learned men who help interpret 
the Quran, not sources of challenge to the authorities, unless 
the authorities are foreign, as in the case of the British 
colonial occupiers in Egypt. Their income, in the case of 
Egypt, comes from the Ministry of Waqfs, or religious affairs. 
This restricts their freedom to disagree too vocally with the 
government. However, by virtue of being the guardians of the 
oldest university in the Muslim world (al-Azhar) , they hold 
the respect of most traditional Egyptians.
Finally, the opposition to the Shah was unified by its 
common goal and its common reaction to the Shah's autocratic 
rule. In Egypt, the opposition is still very fragmented, 
whether within or without the Islamic revival movement. The 
more radical Islamic movements seek to overthrow the
government or withdraw from society completely, while the 
secular parties and the Muslim Brotherhood seek to challenge 
the government through electoral politics. There still does 
not exist in Egypt the consensus about the urgency of the 
removal of the leader that existed in Iran. Revival movements 
in Egypt are just as likely to excommunicate each other's 
members and revile each other's leaders as they are to oppose 
the government.
Thus, while Mubarak faces a crisis in the continued 
deterioration of the economy and the growing dissatisfaction 
of members of the underprivileged segments of society, he is 
not facing a revolution yet." In order to diffuse the more 
violent Islamic revival groups, Mubarak may have to implement 
some changes in the secular constitution of Egypt and in his 
relations with the West. However, his dependence on U.S. aid 
may inhibit the reforms necessary to stop the growing 
popularity of Islamic revival movements. Nevertheless, the 
Islamic revival movements are not yet the causes of an 
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